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The Functional Approach in Comparative Socio-Legal Research:  
Reflections Based on a Study of Plural Work Regulation in Australia and Indonesia1 
 
Petra Mahy2 
 
Abstract  
This article examines the potential use and limits of Zweigert and Kötz’ classical functional 
approach in comparative law for an empirical socio-legal research project. The project 
involves a comparison of the formal labour laws and informal norms and institutions which 
regulate restaurant work in the cities of Melbourne, Australia, and Yogyakarta, Indonesia. 
The article argues that the functional approach is a necessary but incomplete method for 
overcoming the many issues of comparability between the two research sites; the method 
requires both extension of its analytical steps and explicit explanation of its limitations. 
 
I. Introduction 
 
Comparative socio-legal research more often turns to the methods of legal anthropology and 
the concept of legal culture than it does to traditional comparative law methods (Banakar and 
Travers 2005:240–41). Disregarding this trend, this article, which reflects on the results of 
empirical qualitative studies of plural work regulation in Australia and Indonesia, evaluates 
the usefulness of the functional approach as formulated in the classic chapter on comparative 
law method by Zweigert and Kötz (1998:32–47). The aim of the article is to lay the 
foundations for an explicit and systematic comparative analysis of the two sets of empirical 
data, hence responding to the calls of socio-legal theorists for comparative research which 
moves beyond mere ‘butterfly collecting’ (Cotterrell 2012:40) or ‘comparison by 
juxtaposition’ (Nelken 2005:248).  
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For this project, interview data was collected on the substance of, and interactions between, 
the formal laws and informal norms and institutions that regulate work arrangements in 
restaurants and other eateries in two very different cities: Melbourne, Australia, and 
Yogyakarta, Indonesia.3 This was a pilot project aimed at initial exploration of the topic and 
to discover if the planned semi-structured interview methodology would be successful in 
examining this particular phenomenon in such different country contexts. The project was 
inspired by the observation that while there has been much attention paid recently to the 
failure of labour law to protect many workers around the world (e.g. Davidov and Langille 
2006; Fudge et al. 2011; Teklè 2010), there is far less understanding of the informal norms 
and institutions which, in the absence of, or in interaction with, labour laws, do govern the 
work arrangements and practices of these workers (Cooney et al. 2014; Mitchell et al. 2014; 
Sportel 2013; Tsikata 2011; Harriss-White 2010:179). Meanwhile, various policy initiatives 
such as those of the International Labour Organisation (ILO) continue to promote the 
formalisation of informal work around the world with little emphasis placed on the 
importance of understanding the role and effects of informal norms and their interactions 
with formal labour laws.4  
 
The studies in Melbourne and Yogyakarta have produced rich datasets in which restaurant 
workers from a range of establishments described the various aspects of their work 
arrangements and explained how these were put in place and their perspectives on the validity 
of these arrangements. As such, the results of the project appear far more significant than 
merely providing a test of the merits of the methodology used. Initial impressions of the data 
suggest that there are a number of overlaps and similarities in the findings in the two cities 
and that a set of shared concepts and understandings is emerging from the data. Comparison 
of the two sets of results may allow wider generalisations to be made about the content and 
effects of informal norms and their interactions with formal labour law. Therefore, the 
project’s potential may be enhanced by producing an explicit comparative analysis of the two 
cases.  
 
There are four main aspects of the project which present particular challenges for 
comparison. First, it seeks to compare research findings from two urban contexts which are 
                                                
3 For the results of the study on Yogyakarta, Indonesia, see Mahy et al. (forthcoming).  
4 See, for example, ILO 2013; and ILO Recommendation no. 204 Concerning the Transition from the Informal 
to the Formal Economy, 2015.  
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located within countries that are probably as culturally and economically different as any two 
neighbouring countries in the world. This means that there are countless contextual variables 
to be taken account of which may impede meaningful comparative analysis. Second, while all 
comparative projects have the potential for bias, in comparing research conducted in a 
developed country with research conducted in a developing country the risk of ethnocentrism 
affecting the analysis is particularly high.  
 
Third, the project is framed within a ‘regulation’ approach (Parker et al. 2004; Frazer 2014) 
which takes into consideration the plurality of sources of social ordering, that is, both formal 
laws produced by the state as well as informal (or non-state) norms and institutions. This 
approach recognises that informal norms and institutions often play complementary or even 
substitutive roles when formal regulation is absent or ignored (Helmke and Levitsky 2004; 
Chiba 1998). This raises challenging issues of consistently defining ‘law’ and ‘non-law’ and 
making the same causal assumptions about links between laws/non-laws and behavioural 
outcomes across the two cases.  
 
Fourth, this research broadly falls within the area of labour law, which in recent times has 
been undergoing much soul searching about its disciplinary scope, functions and previously 
assumed universality. These debates include questions about the applicability of models of 
the employment relationship which evolved in the West to so-called ‘non-traditional’ work 
generally and to developing country contexts specifically (see, e.g. discussion in Davidov and 
Langille 2011; Fudge et al. 2011). This means that ‘labour law’ and its constituent elements, 
perhaps even more so than other areas of law, is certainly not a model that can be taken for 
granted as being sufficiently similar across jurisdictions for the purpose of comparison.  
 
As noted, socio-legal scholars have a number of tools to draw on in attempting to overcome 
complex issues of comparability; the notion of ‘legal culture’ is often seen as a primary 
template for comparative socio-legal research (Nelken 1997; Cotterrell 2012:46), while 
others turn to the study of legal transplants, legal consciousness or comparative legal history. 
On the face of it, however, none of these options present a solution to the complexities of 
comparability found in this particular micro-level point-in-time research project. A potential 
method (or at least a starting point) does appear to be offered by the functional approach, 
found specifically in comparative law, but also in comparative sociology. In brief, the 
functional approach requires the following steps: identify a shared social problem in each 
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place under consideration and define it without recourse to legal terms, find and describe the 
‘legal’ and ‘extralegal’ solutions that arise in relation to the problem in each system, identify 
similarities and differences between the solutions, build a conceptual language capable of 
discussing all the cases, find explanations for similarities and differences in the wider 
context, and finally, critically and normatively evaluate the findings (Zweigert and Kötz 
1998:32–47). Hence, the functional approach is very suited to micro-level projects due to its 
focus on particular social problems and their solutions. In addition, it is not, as is commonly 
thought, restricted to consideration of formal laws and so appears to lend itself to wider 
socio-legal research. 
 
While the functional approach when formulated as this series of steps seems straightforward 
and has been sometimes claimed to be the method in comparative law, in recent times it has 
become somewhat unfashionable. Many fundamental critiques have been proffered against 
the functional approach, especially regarding the ‘constructed’ nature of social problems, the 
artificial stripping back of context, misplaced positivist assumptions about the relationship 
between law and society (Frankenberg 1985; Legrand 2003), and the production of 
ethnocentric and ‘Orientalist’ results (Ruskola 2002). The questions to be resolved in this 
article are whether these critiques of the functional method are indeed sustained, and if so, 
whether the drawbacks they identify might be overcome in this particular empirical socio-
legal project.  
 
I follow the lead of some other researchers (Husa 2003; Samuel 2014; Valcke 2014; Adams 
and Griffiths 2014) in seeing functionalism as a very useful beginning point in the 
comparative process, provided that its inherent limitations are recognised and that certain 
additional analytical steps are taken. These limitations include the impossibility of drawing 
strong causal connections between law/norms and behaviour, and between the differences 
observed and wider social context, as well as the ultimate futility of a search for completely 
unbiased comparative concepts. The additional steps required include using both ‘inner’ and 
‘outer’ perspectives to shed light on causal connections. An optional additional step of 
examining legal consciousness is potentially beneficial to the analysis.      
 
The structure of this article is as follows: I begin by explaining the empirical project, its aims 
and methods in more detail, together with a brief description of the preliminary research 
findings in Yogyakarta and Melbourne. I then discuss the defining of the social problem 
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within the functional approach, and then the step of identifying the ‘legal’ and ‘extralegal’ 
solutions to that problem. In the next sections I examine the particular drawbacks with the 
functional approach – the making of positivist assumptions about the links between law and 
behaviour, the challenge of developing a conceptual language that does not perpetuate legal 
ethnocentrism and then the use of context and causation in analysis. I also discuss the 
possibility of building on the functional comparative approach to examine legal 
consciousness and collective narratives of legality. Finally, I reflect on the potential for 
policy formulation arising from this comparative research.  
II. Project Aims 
 
Two main discovery questions underpin the research in the two cities: first, what informal 
norms and institutions play a role in regulating work arrangements in restaurants? And 
second, how do these informal modes of regulation interact with formal labour standards 
laws?  In other words, the research seeks to understand what is actually regulating work 
arrangements across a range of restaurants, and how this might differ from the assumptions 
often made about the effects of state labour laws. Comparative labour law has tended to be 
dominated by doctrinal law studies (see e.g. Finkin 2015), and to date there has been only 
limited empirical labour law research conducted (Deakin 2010:309; Ludlow and Blackham 
2015). Labour law scholars, in contrast to some other areas of law, have been slow to debate 
the limits of law and the existence of legal or regulatory pluralism (Frazer 2014). Meanwhile, 
other disciplines including anthropology, labour geography and gender studies have produced 
numerous works on ‘informal employment’ in both developed and developing economies, but 
these have rarely discussed the interface between informal work regulation and formal labour 
law (see the extensive literature review in Mahy et al. forthcoming). Taking a regulatory 
approach to labour studies, which includes recognition of informal types of ordering, should 
assist with identifying how the law actually operates and its effects on work arrangements 
and the social conditions of workers (Frazer 2014).  
 
Twining (2009) has argued that socio-legal studies of pluralism have tended to be conceived 
narrowly and to be mainly descriptive with little practical relevance. They rarely venture into 
the realm of ‘justification, legitimation and evaluation’ (2009:503). In contrast, these research 
projects in Yogyakarta and Melbourne have an evaluative component concerned with both 
insider and outsider views of the effects of laws and norms on work arrangements and 
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workers’ wellbeing. It is likely that the research will have policy implications for efforts to 
formalise informal work, particularly relating to the programmes of the ILO. The value of 
this comparative study in the two very different locations must ultimately be found in the 
uncovering and explaining of at least some unexpected similarities, but also in evaluating the 
different outcomes for workers and challenging the dominant focus on exporting Western 
labour regulation models as solutions to developing country problems.    
III. Empirical Research Methods  
 
The data collection methods for this project were, of course, designed to suit these aims. The 
restaurant sector was selected for the project as it tends to include both formally and 
informally regulated businesses in both Indonesia and Australia. In Yogyakarta and 
Melbourne, workers were interviewed in a range of restaurants and other eateries covering 
different sized businesses and types and expense of food served etc. The workers were asked 
about their personal backgrounds, the full scope of their work arrangements including 
recruitment, contracts or agreements, remuneration and other benefits, discipline, social 
security, knowledge of labour laws and standards and their motivations for preferring or 
accepting more formally or informally regulated workplaces. Thirty interviews were 
conducted in each place during 2013 and 2014. These were, as mentioned, semi-structured 
interviews arranged around the same set of questions in each city, but respondents were also 
given space to describe issues that they thought were important in their workplace. The 
interviews in Yogyakarta were conducted in Indonesian, and the interviews in Melbourne in 
English. Due to practical and ethical considerations different participant recruitment methods 
were used in the two cities. In Yogyakarta workplaces were approached directly and 
permission was sought to speak to workers, while in Melbourne advertisements were placed 
and most participants were interviewed in a neutral location. Nonetheless, in both places a 
good mix of respondents was obtained with respect to gender, ethnicity, migrant status and 
job role. Each set of interviews has been transcribed and is being analysed separately using 
qualitative data analysis software for similarities and differences across the interviews.    
IV. Preliminary Findings 
 
The analysis of the interview results is still ongoing, so the observations presented here are 
preliminary impressions. In Yogyakarta, the research found quite a clear spectrum of 
formality in the regulation of work in restaurants, ranging from enterprises which followed 
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Indonesian labour laws closely, through to a wide band of businesses which mixed formal 
laws and informal norms in different ways, through to places where informal norms were 
dominant. These informal norms tended to be labelled as kekeluargaan or ‘family-ness’ 
which covered a bundle of interrelated ideas including: reciprocity, patron-client or parent-
child type relationships, flexibility in terms of rules, leniency towards a worker’s family and 
social responsibilities, the expectation that a worker can approach the business owner about 
their personal and financial problems, as well as laughing and joking in the workplace. 
‘Institutions of social identity’ (Harriss-White 2010) including ethnicity and gender were 
clearly important aspects of informal regulation but rarely constituted any hard and fast rules. 
Respondents reported that in some workplaces religious values were important aspects to 
their work arrangements particularly where business owners felt a moral obligation to 
encourage or ensure the piety of their workers. Particularly in the middle-band of the 
spectrum it was possible to discern the modification of formal labour laws according to local 
values and reasoning. For example, paying below minimum wage levels was often 
rationalised if the worker was also being provided with accommodation and meals by the 
business owner. In Yogyakarta, informality in work regulation appeared to be supported by 
workers’ consistent articulation of narratives about the flexible applicability of labour law.   
 
In Melbourne, the interviewees also reported a range of formally and informally regulated 
practices. While many of the interviewees labelled themselves as ‘casual’ workers (casual 
work being one of the major forms of legal non-standard employment in Australia) their 
actual conditions were determined much more informally. In informally regulated workplaces 
unpaid trials, being paid below the minimum wages and paid cash-in-hand (i.e. without 
declaring wages for taxation purposes) were common. Such informal norms could be traced 
across business clusters, with, for example, workers in Asian restaurants in particular 
reporting quite uniform, below-minimum wages. Ethnicity and gender were important factors 
in many of the work arrangements, but none of the workers reported any religious aspects to 
their situation. Some respondents described fictive kinship within their workplaces, for 
example, with workers invited to sit down to ‘family’ meals with business owners and other 
employees. Many said that personal integrity and feelings of social debt towards their 
employer were factors in their acceptance of informal regulation of their work arrangements. 
The distribution of tips, which is not regulated by law at all, was a particularly interesting site 
of informal norms, with many respondents reporting a disjuncture between what they thought 
‘ought’ to be done, and what ‘is’ done in practice.  
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This brief overview of the findings in the two cities indicates many differences, but also some 
intriguing similarities in terms of the actual content of the informal norms and with respect to 
the ways that they interact with the formal labour laws in each country. The question to be 
addressed in this article is to what extent these findings may be said to be validly comparable 
when approached through the functional method.  
V. Comparability and the ‘Social Problem’ 
 
As noted above, this project involves setting up an explicit binary comparison between 
empirical socio-legal research conducted in Yogyakarta, Indonesia, and Melbourne, 
Australia. Despite being near neighbours, the political, legal, economic and cultural 
differences between Australia and Indonesia are obvious; at a very general level Australia has 
a developed economy, a common law heritage, a relatively small population with a small 
informal economy while Indonesia is a developing country, broadly has a civil law heritage, 
the fourth largest population in the world and a very large informal economy. The cities of 
Yogyakarta and Melbourne have very different demographics and heritages.  
 
Both Indonesia and Australia have extensive labour law and industrial dispute resolution 
systems. Although the specifics of the laws and formal institutions in the two countries are 
certainly different on various levels, due to international diffusion of labour laws and 
standards particularly through the efforts of the ILO and other globalising factors, it can also 
be said that there are general similarities in terms of content and issues covered.  A recent 
quantitative study shows that since the early 2000s when Indonesia’s labour laws were 
dramatically reworked, the combined protective effect of the labour laws on the books in 
Indonesia and Australia has actually been quite similar. They each have strengths in different 
areas of worker protection but overall close aggregate scores (Anderson et al. 2015). This 
accounts for the law in the books, but implementation of these labour laws is certainly not the 
same – these countries have vastly different rankings on rule of law indices – and once these 
are taken into account Indonesia is shown to have lower levels of worker protection than 
Australia (Anderson et al. 2015).  
 
One could continue enumerating the differences between the two research sites indefinitely. 
It is a truism that one cannot usefully compare things that are essentially dissimilar or 
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incommensurable. There are, therefore, significant issues of comparability to be overcome if 
a comparison between the two studies is to be valid. For Zweigert and Kötz (1998), one 
should not begin a comparison with legal categories which are likely to be based on home 
jurisdiction preconceptions, but rather legal solutions are said to be comparable if they relate 
to the same social problem. In their words, ‘the legal system of every society faces essentially 
the same problems, and solves these problems by quite different means though very often 
with similar results’ (2008:34). In this way, through isolating the social problem the 
complexity of contextual differences between cases is reduced in a controlled way, and a 
common point of entry into different legal systems is provided (Valcke 2012). The different 
solutions that arise from the same social problems are said to be ‘functional equivalents’. The 
social problem once identified should be stated in purely social terms so as to avoid the legal 
preconceptions held by the researcher (Zweigert and Kötz 1998:35).   
 
In this project, the social problem can be formulated as the need to arrange work in 
restaurants so as to fulfil the requirements of the business owner to deliver food and service 
to customers and make a profit while at the same time ensuring a certain level of satisfaction 
and benefits to workers. The social problem has been carefully defined in order to avoid the 
traditional idea of a dyadic relationship between employer and employee, and the associated 
assumption that the main role played by labour law is to mediate that relationship. In so 
doing, I aim to recognise the reality of multiple significant relationships both within the 
workplace and between individuals in the workplace and the wider community. It is also 
intended to capture the many constituent aspects of work arrangements, covering the full 
range from recruitment through to ending the work arrangement, without presupposing the 
existence of a legal contract of employment.  
 
However, one of the major critiques of the functionalist approach holds that social problems 
are not necessarily the same, but are rather artificially ‘constructed’ as being the same 
(Frankenberg 1985; Whitman 2003:14; Legrand 2003:292). In fact, Zweigert and Kötz 
(1998:39–40) did not take the position that all social problems will have exact equivalents in 
other societies, or that all social problems will necessarily produce solutions. They 
particularly cautioned against comparing problems which are ‘heavily impressed by moral 
views or values’ such as in family law or inheritance or problems which are overly political 
or rooted in the particularities of religion or history. Oddly, it is quite rare for functionalists to 
explicitly define the social problem that they are addressing (Michaels 2006:341). Leyland 
 10 
 
(2002:216) in a comparative study of public law in Italy and the United Kingdom found that 
‘the attempt to approach the distribution, exercise, and containment of state power’ served as 
the social problem. Valcke (2014:33) observed in her study of French and English contract 
law that ‘mismatches between subjective intention and objective declaration, or the concern 
to consecrate yet also discipline party intention’ were common to both places. Adams and 
Griffiths (2014) found enough similarity in modern European healthcare systems and the 
problem of how to approach end of life decisions to be a basis for comparison of euthanasia 
laws and related practices. 
 
I agree with the view that it is quite conceivable for a social problem to exist in one place and 
not in another – or for particular behavioural patterns to exist but not be viewed as a 
‘problem’. Whether there is a shared social problem in different societies should be a matter 
of careful empirical observation and judgement and is more likely to be validly claimed in 
situations relating to basic human needs and aspects of modern economic life. In this case, I 
observed that restaurants and other eateries in Yogyakarta and Melbourne basically have 
similarities in aims, physical structures and business organisation and share the same need for 
labour even if there are variations in terms of numbers of workers and exact work roles. More 
generally, there is also the basic shared economic reality of the need for capital growth 
(profit) alongside the distributive problem of needing to provide benefits to labour.  
VI. ‘Legal’ and ‘Extralegal’ Solutions  
 
Having identified the social problem, the next step in the functional approach is to describe 
the solutions provided by the systems in each place. The solutions to the social problem are 
not limited by particular areas of law. Hence, in this project I am not bound by labour law 
solutions to the problem, but should also take account of other sources of regulation including 
social security, taxation and business registration requirements which converge on the 
particular social problem (see Frazer 2014:9).  
 
Zweigert and Kötz, very relevantly to this project, acknowledge that the solutions to 
particular problems may not necessarily be ‘legal’ but may be produced by ‘extralegal’ norms 
and institutions. In defining ‘extralegal’ they include practices which supersede or bypass 
legislation and judge-made law as well as the unwritten rules of commercial practice. They 
explain that a social problem in one place may have legal solutions while in another it may be 
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solved by a custom or social practice (Zweigert and Kötz 1998:35). As an example of an 
‘extralegal’ solution, they cited the growth of title insurance companies in the United States 
which had emerged in reaction to a vacuum in the legal property titling system.  
 
This socio-legal aspect of Zweigert and Kötz’ functional method has been largely overlooked 
by comparatists. A literature search has discovered few studies that have explicitly used the 
functional comparative method and included both ‘legal’ and ‘extralegal’ solutions to a social 
problem. One exception is Adams and Griffiths (2014) in their comparative study of 
euthanasia laws which included consideration of ‘para-legal’ sources of law, which in their 
research context meant internal organisational rules and professional guidelines. According to 
Michaels (2006:364), comparative lawyers’ tendency to only take account of formal legal 
rules and their application is ‘a flaw in practice, not in method’. This tendency may be at least 
partly attributed to what I consider to be a fundamental misinterpretation of this aspect of the 
functional comparative method by some critics. Frankenberg (1985:438) in his early critique 
of functionalism, wrote:  
 
There is nothing outside legal texts and institutions for functionalists. Law as 
consciousness or cluster of beliefs is beyond a perspective that focuses on the 
instrumental efficiency of legal regulations. Functionalism has no eye and no 
sensitivity for what is not formalised and not regulated under a given legal regime. 
What started out as a fascinating hypothetical experiment has turned into a rather 
dry affirmation of legal formalism.  
 
Legrand (2003:292), also in a prominent critique of the functional approach, and quoting 
Frankenberg, agreed that functionalism does not look beyond the formal law. Brand 
(2007:410) seems to be making a similar assumption where he writes that the functional 
approach allows a comparatist to ‘stay within the familiar legal framework, rather than 
having to venture into sociological research’. These commentators were referring to the 
dominant body of comparative law research which does focus on the formal law. The 
existence of this literature, however, does not of itself place any impediment to fully using 
the method as set out by Zweigert and Kötz, and taking a particularly socio-legal and/or 
regulatory approach to considering the solutions that arise in relation to a particular social 
problem.     
 
The inclusion of ‘extralegal’ solutions in the functional approach, however, does complicate 
matters. Zwiegert and Kötz take the distinction between ‘legal’ and ‘extralegal’ solutions for 
granted. But the problem of where to draw the ‘definitional stop’ (Twining 2009) between 
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law and non-law has been a problem grappled with by legal pluralism scholars for decades. 
Many legal anthropologists have argued that ‘law’ does not need to emanate from the state 
but may be produced within much smaller social units (beginning with the work of 
Malinowski 1926). This labelling of many different types of social or economic ordering as 
law has raised questions about where to draw a line between law and social practice (Merry 
1988:878). A current leading approach is to turn to the idea of regulatory pluralism (which 
recognises multiple sources of social ordering) rather than legal pluralism (which focuses on 
multiple sources of ‘law’), while at the same time retaining an appreciation for the 
importance and distinctiveness of state law (Tamanaha 2008; Parker et al. 2004). I adopt this 
approach in this project, but prefer the terms ‘formal’ and ‘informal’, where ‘formal’ refers to 
state laws and institutions which may have a greater degree of intentionality in terms of their 
relationship to the social problem and where ‘informal’ covers non-state derived forms of 
regulation which may arise more ‘organically’ through repeated practices and negotiation in 
relation to the problem. This helps to avoid the problem of implicitly only attributing legality 
to state law.  
 
There still remains the problem of the tendency to conceptualise a hierarchy of regulation in 
which the term ‘informal’ is taken to cover an inferior residual category of everything that is 
not formal. This tendency obscures both the complexities of how people perceive the 
different strands of structuring forces in their lives and the high importance that informal 
forms of regulation can have in producing social order and facilitating economic activity 
(Benton 1994). Another erroneous assumption often made is that informal forms of 
regulation are necessarily ‘unstructured’ and/or ‘chaotic’. Such assumptions have been shown 
to be conceptually unsound and have been a powerful impetus for government interventions 
that then resulted in policy disasters (Guha-Khasnobis et al. 2006). Hence, this project needs 
to give appropriate weighting to both the formal and informal solutions that are identified in 
the interview material. The project should not assume that problems should be solved by 
formal rather than informal means, and it should be prepared to compare the formal and 
informal solutions on equal footing. In addition, the comparative analysis of the solutions in 
the two cities should be open-minded and privilege neither difference nor similarity, but be 
ready to discover either situation (Cotterrell 2012:39).    
 
Zweigert and Kötz did not clearly envision the use of empirical data in seeking for the ‘legal’ 
and ‘extralegal’ solutions to the chosen social problem. Instead they merely hint that the 
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comparatist should explore the chosen legal systems as deeply as possible and use creative 
thinking to find all the possible solutions. The implications of using the kind of empirical data 
as collected in this project is dealt with in the following section on positivism.   
VII. Positivist Links between Regulation and Behaviour 
 
Critiques of the functionalist method point out that it rests on the positivist assumption that 
law (and other ‘extralegal’ solutions) arise from particular social problems. That is, that ‘law 
is determined by social problems’ or at least that law and social problems are co-determined 
(Frankenberg 1985:437). This requires an evolutionary vision where ‘law progressively 
adapts to social needs or interests, or develops through interacting with its environment’ (Ibid 
438). So, it is argued, functionalism artificially separates law from society, and takes an 
essentially technical and utilitarian approach to analysis (Legrand 2003).   
 
Of course, this functionalist vision of law contradicts the empirical reality that ‘rules only 
ever imperfectly guide behaviour and sometimes not at all’ (Galligan 2007:207). Particular 
laws may do things other than directly regulate social behaviour or be functionally related to 
a current social problem – for example, they may signal to the international community, 
produce a discourse, create a framework of expectations or produce a ‘shadow’ under which 
private parties may bargain (Mnookin and Kornhauser 1979) or they may just be leftovers 
from earlier times and do nothing (Watson 2000). Laws may also have more than one 
function, or they may have been put in place with the intention of performing a particular 
function but over time that function may change. It seems to me that the fact that some laws 
do not have direct links to social problems or that laws may serve more than one function at 
once or have no function at all is not actually a critical problem to the functionalist method 
because such laws are not included in the analysis. That is, the functionalist is only interested 
in comparing the laws that are in play in any particular situation and should exclude any that 
might have been intended to respond to a particular problem but in practice do not. If a 
researcher wanted to compare laws that have no behaviour regulating function in relation to 
the selected social problem then they would need some other comparative approach.  
 
That said, there remains the problem of assuming a positivist link between patterns of 
behaviour and regulation. In both sets of empirical data in this project a causal leap needs to 
be made between the work arrangements documented through the interview data and the 
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assumption that it is a particular form of regulation that causes it. In situations of reference to 
law, causation between the work arrangements described in the interviews and their origin 
can be more easily inferred, such as where the detail of a particular labour law was exactly or 
closely reproduced in reality. This can be more complicated where law may be guiding 
behaviour indirectly, such as where it sets standards even if they are not fully implemented. 
For example, as noted above, the payment of the minimum wage in Indonesia is a legal 
requirement that most people are aware of but it is often interpreted loosely when other 
benefits are also provided to employees. That is, the law has some effect but this occurs in 
combination with other values and informal reasoning. It is also the case where the law has 
formalised a pre-existing informal practice that it becomes impossible to determine whether 
complying behaviour is caused by the law, the pre-existing informal regulation or both.   
 
Identifying ‘norms’ is also rather complicated. A distinction may be drawn between what 
actors subjectively think ‘ought’ to be done (the ‘internal’ aspect of a norm), and what ‘is’ 
commonly done in practice (the ‘external’ aspect) (Hart 1961:81; Kelsen 1967). Banakar 
(2015:216) writes that the ‘external’ aspect of social norms can be ‘revealed through tangible 
and observable behaviour and can be studied by employing empirical methods’. However, 
Baier (2013:63) warns that mere recurrent patterns of behaviour are not necessarily the result 
of norms, and equally, norms (as ‘ought’) do not necessarily result in particular behaviour. 
Further, normative openness is possible where many types of social ordering are acceptable. 
In cases where there are competing norms, an actor may rationalise a choice between them 
according to their own individual interests.   
 
Beyond the problem of identifying effective solutions to the social problem, one could easily 
incorrectly assume that both systems have similar conceptions of law and non-law and that 
they both share positivist ideas about the links between laws/norms and outcomes (Samuel 
2014:80). Hence, rendering this process of inference comparable across the two cases is 
potentially even more problematic. It appears that combined ‘outer’ and ‘inner’ 
understandings of the social problem (Samuel 2014:106) may assist with overcoming this 
issue of comparability. The data collected in this project can support analysis of an ‘inner’ 
understanding of how workers view their circumstances and in particular how they viewed 
any links between their own work arrangements and formal labour laws and other informal 
norms, and indeed if and how they make a distinction between formal and informal 
regulation. In some cases they were able to explain what ‘ought’ to be the case and what was 
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actually occurring in practice. This introduces a subjective element to the analysis, which of 
course has its own weaknesses as workers in particular may not know how their work 
arrangement was determined by their employer,5 but it does assist with the drawing of more 
defensible causal linkages.  
 
For example, many of the interviewees in Yogyakarta expressed a very clear view that their 
work arrangements were not affected by formal law, but instead were justifiably arranged 
according to norms of kekeluargaan or ‘family-ness’. Similarly, in Melbourne a number of 
interviewees reported that it is a ‘secret rule’ that everyone who works in restaurants in 
Chinatown is paid a particular hourly rate, hence the source of this particular practice (at least 
subjectively) is made clear. Paying attention to the ‘inner perspective’ will not necessarily 
establish a positive link between behaviour and regulation, but it should help avoid assuming 
that there are similarities in the links between law/norms and outcomes in the two research 
sites. Further, it must be acknowledged that conclusive identification of norms will probably 
not be possible given the limitation of the moderately small number of interviews (thirty) 
conducted in each city for this project. 
VIII. Creating Common Concepts and Avoiding Ethnocentrism 
 
Once the social problem and its ‘legal’ and ‘extralegal’ solutions have been identified, and 
positivist assumptions addressed, the next step in the functional approach is to develop a 
‘special syntax and vocabulary’ for discussing the comparative analysis. That is, the 
researcher needs to build up categories from the empirical data in both cases and create a 
common conceptual language which is flexible and wide enough to encompass the solutions 
provided by each system under consideration. According to Zweigert and Kötz (1998:43) this 
analytical stage ‘involves adopting a new point of view from which to consider all the 
different solutions’. This is another aspect of the attempt to eradicate preconceptions and 
ethnocentrism on the part of the researcher. This should be done through ‘dialectical 
interchange’ so that researchers become aware of their cultural biases and the problems of 
translation (Nelken 2005:247). Adams and Griffiths (2014:286) suggest that the comparative 
researcher should ‘proceed in a spirit of conceptual tentativeness, seeking continuously to 
smoke out normative preconceptions’.   
 
                                                
5 Employers were not included in the data collection in either the Melbourne or Yogyakarta projects due to the 
supposition that they would be less likely than workers to speak frankly about informal employment practices.  
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To illustrate what this process might involve in the case of the present project, I consider the 
term kekeluargaan (family-ness) which emerged strongly in the Yogyakarta interviews. The 
creation of fictive family relationships in the workplace was also mentioned by some of the 
Melbourne restaurant workers. Kekeluargaan is clearly a context-specific term that is 
indigenous to Indonesia and cannot be used to describe the Melbourne situation. A more 
general concept of ‘fictive kinship’ might serve as an umbrella term that would cover the 
situation in both places and in doing so would highlight similarities across the two cases. 
Choosing to translate kekeluargaan into English and into the broader conceptual term of 
‘fictive kinship’, however, will necessarily result in the loss of the Indonesian specificity of 
the term, and analysis might become skewed towards a finding of similarity rather than of 
difference.  
 
This problem of translation in the act of socio-legal comparison has, of course, been long 
recognised and debated (Moore 1969), although Zweigert and Kötz themselves do not 
explicitly recognise it within their direction to develop a common vocabulary. It is clear that 
descriptive and analytical language can never be completely free of bias, even after 
progressing through a dialectic process (Puchalska-Tych and Salter 1996). In the example 
given here I could continue considering different conceptual options for kekeluargaan, 
including keeping the term in the vernacular, but in the end I may need to accept that my 
analysis is being conducted in English, and that I am drawing on my own analytical abilities 
(and prejudices) and that this will always skew the results. One can only recognise this reality 
and ‘be self-reflective and self-critical’ (Frankenberg 1985:441), and explicitly declare one’s 
subjective position.  
 
Given that this project seeks to compare conditions in a city located in a ‘developed’ nation 
with a city located in a ‘developing’ nation, there is a political risk to translation and bias 
beyond mere conceptual comparability. As Baxi (2003) persuasively argued a danger lies in 
attributing too much significance to the colonial moment and engaging in progress narratives 
when describing developing or post-colonial countries’ legal systems. The developing 
country can, he argued, very easily end up being depicted as the ‘exotic other’. Ruskola 
(2002) proffered a similar analysis of many Western studies of law in China as being 
examples of ‘Legal Orientalism’, particularly those which take an extreme functionalist 
approach which insist on finding exact equivalents. This risk arises in this project with 
Australian researchers comparing Australia with Indonesia as a developing Asian country, 
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but also because it is broadly a labour law project. Progress narratives have tended to 
underpin understandings of labour law. It is often assumed that developing countries are on 
the same industrialisation trajectory as Western developed economies with labour law 
expected to play the same role (see discussion in Mitchell, Mahy and Gahan 2014 and Teklè 
2010). As noted, the ILO continues to pursue policies of bringing all or as many workers as 
possible within formal labour regulation. In the case of this project, every effort will need to 
be made to ensure that the ‘legal’ and ‘extralegal’ solutions found in each place are treated 
equally and that any teleological assumptions about one case providing the pattern or future 
of the other will need to be carefully avoided.  
IX. Context and Causation 
 
It is certainly true, that in focusing on the social problem and its solutions at the micro-level, 
the functional approach begins by excluding all of the systemic, societal, moral, cultural and 
historical differences between the cases being compared. Frankenberg (1985:440) particularly 
disdains this aspect of the functional approach, arguing that ‘the functionalist negates the 
interaction between legal institutions and provisions by stripping them from their systemic 
context and integrating them in an artificial universal typology of “solutions”’. He also writes 
that functionalism requires the contradictory operation of both suppressing the context and 
considering it. Indeed in Zweigert and Kötz’ method, the solutions that arise in relation to a 
particular social problem should first be freed from the context of their own system, but then 
afterwards we need to ask why societies may meet the same need in similar or different ways. 
The answers to this ‘may lie anywhere in the whole realm of social life, and one may have to 
venture into the domains of other social sciences such as economics, sociology or political 
science’ (1998:44).  
 
This stripping away of context, and then later considering it for explanatory purposes is 
certainly artificial, but it does serve as a useful heuristic tool, provided that it is recognised as 
such. The advantage, I think, of starting with the problem and then selectively referring to 
context for explanatory purposes means that one does not drown as deeply in the differences 
between the two places. For example, preliminary analysis of the empirical results indicate 
that  the division between the common law system in Australia and the civil law heritage in 
Indonesia has no apparent explanatory value in this study and can be safely ignored. That is, 
the interactions between formal law and informal regulation appear to have little to do with 
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the heritage of the law itself. Meanwhile, the more prominent role of religion in Indonesian 
social life compared to more secular Australia appears to account for the more commonly 
observed reference to religious principles in the work arrangements in Yogyakarta.  
 
I do not propose to use the concept of ‘legal culture’ as an explanatory variable here. Legal 
culture is an amorphous idea which is usually taken to refer to a complex aggregate set of 
legal practices, cultural patterns and attitudes of legal practitioners and the general population 
observed in a certain time and place (Nelken 1997; Cotterrell 2010). It may be useful for 
particular purposes, but it is difficult to define and encompasses various different dimensions 
(Merry 2010). Often legal culture is seen as a residual explanatory factor that is brought into 
play when everything else has been accounted for (Ibid). I also agree with Banakar (2009:78) 
that there are often aspects of context that need to be taken account of, such as the structure 
of the economy or political regime change, that are not easily described in cultural terms.  
 
Zweigert and Kötz do not explain if it is possible, and if so how, to prove causation between 
context and the differences and similarities between the identified solutions to the social 
problem. It is likely that explanations of the links between the micro-level findings in this 
project and the wider context can only be speculative as causation cannot be proven 
(Cotterrell 2010). It may be that a particular norm or law appears to be linked to a particular 
context but is instead caused by some other factor. Further, contextual factors can rarely be 
disentangled but rather they act in complex combined ways. For example, it is tempting to 
draw a link between the creation of the category of ‘casual’ work as a major form of non-
standard employment in Australia and the observation that many informally regulated 
workers in Melbourne described themselves as being casual workers. However, there is no 
way of knowing if there is a causal link between this context and the empirical observations. 
Hence, any conclusions regarding the causes for the differences and similarities will need to 
be carefully qualified as to their speculative nature.  
  
X. Building on the Functional Approach using Legal Consciousness 
 
Frankenberg (1985:438) in his critique of functionalism, as quoted above, stated that there is 
no place in the functional method for gaining an understanding of law as consciousness or 
cluster of beliefs, and indeed this is not a step included in Zweigert and Kötz’ formula. 
Frankenberg was writing prior to the growth in legal consciousness as a socio-legal concept 
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and comparative tool which occurred during the 1990s, and was basing his comments on 
doctrinal, rather than empirical, comparative law studies. I take the view that there are no 
impediments to building on the functional approach to comparison by using a narrowly 
focused legal consciousness methodology.  Given the micro-level nature of the empirical 
research required to support the functional approach, it would not be possible to combine it 
with attempts to analyse legal culture or broader legal consciousness methods.   
 
Legal consciousness research methods range from the very broad approach of Ewick and 
Silbey (1998), where they conducted hundreds of interviews with randomly selected adults 
and were careful to ask about everyday life rather than directly about law, to more focused 
approaches which select a particular group of people, such as the environmental activists 
(Halliday and Morgan 2013) or welfare recipients (Sarat 1990). Not all scholars follow Ewick 
and Silbey’s choice of not asking directly about law (e.g. Kurkchiyan 2011). Engel’s (2005) 
research on the legal consciousness of people injured in traffic accidents in Chiangmai, 
Thailand, perhaps comes closest to focusing on a specific social problem (an injury) and the 
solutions that injured people seek (law, negotiation, religious ritual etc.).  
 
This socio-legal comparative project does have the potential to shed light on different 
individual and collective attitudes towards law situated within the boundaries of the research 
as functionally defined by the social problem and its solutions. The interview questions 
elicited indications of the attitudes towards law (or ‘inner’ perspective) and the applicability 
of law to the social problem of determining working conditions in restaurants. Of particular 
comparative interest here are the different narratives that support the distinction between 
formal law and informal norms in the different cities.  
 
For example, in the Yogyakarta study many respondents in smaller eateries articulated a very 
clear and unconcerned view that their situation fell outside the scope of labour law, which 
they saw as only applying to large companies. In other words, they saw legality in very 
flexible terms. In Melbourne, some of the interviewees who were working in more informally 
regulated situations tended to convey a much greater sense of unease about breaking the law 
and that injustice was occurring. These observations made within different points in the 
spectrum of formal and informally regulated restaurants do not appear to map easily onto the 
major narratives of legal consciousness identified by leading researchers (Ewick and Silbey 
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1998; Halliday and Morgan 2013), suggesting that narratives expressed within situations of 
strong normative pluralism need further investigation.   
 
Therefore, setting the external boundaries of the research project through using functional 
parameters is no obstacle to later developing analysis of interviewee’s notions of legality, 
though one must take a narrowly focused approach to legal consciousness-based analysis. 
While this is certainly an optional rather than compulsory additional step to successfully 
employing the functional approach, it does enhance the analytical potential of the present 
comparative project. It also links closely to the need to gain an ‘inner perspective’ in order to 
explore causation, as discussed above. This is certainly not a call for all legal consciousness 
studies to build on the functional approach, but I do think that it does provide a concrete point 
of comparability across cases, which studies of legal consciousness or legal culture that try to 
capture nation-wide attitudes and narratives often lack.   
 
XI. Evaluation and Policy Consequences 
 
The final step in Zweigert and Kötz’ functional approach is to evaluate the findings both 
critically and normatively and to ask which solutions most effectively respond to the social 
problem in each location. In the case of this particular comparative project, this step offers 
the opportunity to address Twining’s (2009) critique of the lack of ‘justification, legitimation 
and evaluation’ in studies of legal pluralism. As noted, this project is very relevant to the 
current initiatives of the ILO in promoting the formalisation of informal work around the 
world. The comparison in this project should shed light on the role of informal norms in 
regulating work arrangements, the extent to which formal labour law is complemented by, or 
even undermined by, informal norms and institutions, and the likelihood of effective change 
through the use of formal labour laws. The normative measure to be used here is the extent to 
which the ‘legal’ and ‘extralegal’ solutions solve the defined social problem of fulfilling the 
requirements of the restaurant owner to run their business while providing satisfaction and 
benefits to workers. It appears that the functional approach to comparison more easily leads 
to policy implications than wide ranging legal pluralism studies or comparative socio-legal 
based on ‘legal culture’ and other concepts because the analysis is more targeted to a 
particular social problem.  
XII. Conclusion 
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This article set out to evaluate the functional approach as a means of overcoming issues of 
comparability between empirical data collected in two very different cities. Although there 
are certainly complexities and limitations inherent to the functional approach, I have argued 
that overall it does provide a concrete and defensible strategy for undertaking comparison in 
this particular project on formal labour laws and informal norms in the regulation of 
restaurant work. Zweigert and Kötz’ method provides the basic analytical steps, but there are 
some additional modifications and explicit acknowledgement of limitations required. For the 
identification of the social problem, it should be a matter of empirical observation as to 
whether the problem is similar enough in each place to support functional analysis. Equal 
weight needs to be given to identifying and comparing the ‘legal’ and ‘extralegal’ solutions 
that arise in relation to a social problem. To avoid making positivist assumptions about the 
links between law/norms and outcomes, combined outer and inner perspectives should be 
helpful, though may not entirely prove causality. It should be acknowledged that the search 
for unbiased common concepts for comparative analysis should be undertaken, but ultimately 
bias is impossible to eliminate and declarations of researchers’ subjective positions should be 
made. A further limitation to the analysis is that only speculative conclusions will be able to 
be drawn between the similarities and differences observed and their causal links to the wider 
social context. It is contended here that research that is delimited by the functional approach 
can, and indeed should, examine narratives of legal consciousness. This gives further critical 
understanding of the ‘inner perspective’ on the social problem and its ‘legal’ and ‘extralegal’ 
solutions and how these solutions are selected and maintained. Finally, the functional 
approach should provide clear avenues for normative evaluation and formulation of policy 
recommendations.  
 
While the functional approach has come under sustained criticism from certain theorists, it 
seems to me that these theorists have overlooked its clear potential for use in comparative 
socio-legal research. In particular, the emphasis on identifying both ‘legal’ and ‘extralegal’ 
solutions to social problems expands the scope of the functional approach beyond its assumed 
focus on doctrinal comparative law studies. The analytical approach taken in this particular 
project, with its additional methodological and analytical steps and explicit acknowledgement 
of limitations, may be usefully replicated in research projects in other contexts.  
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